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Patient-Tailored Medicine, Part Two:  
Personalized Medicine and the 
Legal Landscape
the idea of publishing an article on personalized medicine and 
healthcare disparities among minority populations had its genesis 
with the american health lawyers association’s advisory council on 
racial and ethnic Diversity. this two-part article was supported by the 
association’s Public interest initiative and written by jeffrey P. Braff, 
Biswajit chatterjee, Meredith hochman, jessica Kennington, chandana 
Kolavala, Katherine layman, corrine Parver, chelsea s. rice, Myra c. selby, 
john r. washlick, and rebecca wolf. the authors’ biographical statements 
appear on the following page.
AbSTrACT: In Part One, the authors addressed the relevance of genetic 
information, and how race and genetics have affected and may impact the 
development of medicines, pharmacogenomics, and personalized medicine in 
the United States.* Part Two examines current and proposed federal and state 
laws and regulations intended to protect individuals from the misuse of genetic 
information, including uses that discriminate based on genetic predispositions. 
This Part next explores the potential for litigation against both manufacturers 
and providers, as well as potential defenses.  The authors also discuss legal issues 
relating to research that relies on the use of genetic information.
CITATION: american health lawyers association’s advisory council on racial and ethnic 
Diversity, Patient-Tailored Medicine, Part Two: Personalized Medicine and the Legal Landscape, 
J. Health & Life Sci. L., january 2009, at 1. © 2009 american health lawyers association, 
www.healthlawyers.org/bookstore. all rights reserved.
*  Am. Health Lawyers Ass’n’s Advisory Council on Racial & Ethnic Diversity, Patient-Tailored 
Medicine, Part One: The Impact of Race and Genetics on Medicine, J. HealtH & life Sci. l. 1 
(Oct. 2008) [hereinafter Patient-Tailored Medicine, Part One].
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Introduction
Personalized medicine uses new methods in molecular analysis 
to better manage a patient’s disease, or predisposition toward a dis-
ease. the goal is to achieve optimal medical outcomes by helping 
physicians and patients choose patient-specific disease management 
approaches based on a patient’s genetic profile. such approaches may 
include genetic screening programs that more precisely diagnose dis-
eases and their sub-types, or that help physicians select the type and 
dose of medication best tailored for a certain group of patients.1 even 
now, personalized medicine is affecting the way in which physicians 
treat patients. for instance, molecular testing is being used to identify 
those breast cancer and colon cancer patients likely to benefit from 
new treatments, and patients newly diagnosed with early stage invasive 
breast cancer are being tested for the likelihood of recurrence.2
as described in Part one of this series,3 the importance of studying 
and mapping the human genome is beyond question. Data on human 
genetic variations helps scientists to understand human origins, sus-
ceptibility to illness, and genetic causes of disease. unfortunately, 
history has been marked by destructive episodes of genetic research 
and attempts at “ethnic cleansing” that make it crucial to consider 
1 Personalized Med. Coal., Personalized Medicine 101, available at  
www.personalizedmedicinecoalition.org/sciencepolicy/personalmed-101_overview.php 
[hereinafter Personalized Medicine 101].
2 Id.
3 Patient-Tailored Medicine, Part One, at 1.
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the ethical and social implications of research in genomics, especially 
research on human genetic variation.4 thus, an analysis of ethical, 
legal, and social implications should be an integral component of 
genetic research undertakings, with the participation of scientists who 
can anticipate and monitor the full range of possible applications of 
the research from the earliest stages.5 this issue is so important that the 
u.s. Department of energy’s (Doe) human Genome Program, which 
oversees the human Genome Project (hGP), devoted three percent 
of its annual hGP budget toward studying the ethical, legal, and social 
issues surrounding the availability of genetic information.6
some of the most troubling ethical questions related to advancing 
genetic knowledge and the ensuing development of personalized med-
icine arise out of issues related to justice and equity.7 as discussed in 
Part one, raced-based differences in medicine8 and inequity in clini-
cal trials for personalized medicine are ways in which unequal access 
between people of different races can be perpetuated. while experts 
note that race-based determination of medical treatment is temporary, 
and a precursor to treatment that is determined person-by-person,9 the 
current method of racial classification in medicine provides unequal 
access between caucasians and african-americans.
ultimately, the answer may lie in science rather than law. to pre-
vent racial inequities in personalized medicine, Peterson-iyer advises 
mis-equating race with genotype.10 rather than conducting race-based 
clinical trials, she recommends that studies focus on the genotype of 
study participants. not only would this draw focus away from indi-
viduals’ arbitrary race classifications, but it likely would provide more 
accurate results. race-based genetic similarities are present only for 
individuals whose recent ancestors are from the same area of the 
world.11 for example, study participants in the african-american 
heart failure trial (a-heft), in which 1,050 self-identified african-
americans participated,12 likely had ancestors from different regions 
4 See Mildred K. Cho & Pamela Sankar, Forensic Genetics and Ethical, Legal and Social 
Implications Beyond the Clinic, 36 Nature GeNeticS S8 (2004).
5 Id.
6 Humane Genome Project Info., Minorities, Race, and Genomics,  
www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/minorities.shtml  
(last visited Sept. 25, 2008).
7 Karen Peterson-Iyer, Pharmacogenomics, Ethics, and Public Policy, 18 KeNNedy iNSt. etHicS J. 
35, 38 (2008) [hereinafter Peterson-Iyer].
8 Id. at 41.
9 Jonathan Kahn, How a Drug Becomes “Ethnic”: Law, Commerce, and the Production of 
Racial Categories in Medicine, 4 yale J. HealtH Pol’y l. & etHicS 101, 128 (2004).
10 Peterson-Iyer, at 52.
11 Hua Tang et al., Genetic Structure, Self-Identified Race/Ethnicity, and Confounding in Case-
Control Association Studies, 76 am. J. Hum. GeNeticS 268, 269–70 (2005).
12 Anne L. Taylor et al., Combination of Isosorbide Dinitrate and Hydralazine in Blacks with 
Heart Failure, 351 New eNG. J. med. 2049 (2004).
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of the world. race is not a biological factor, but rather a “social or 
cultural construct.”13 race is a “pernicious concept that has been used 
to suggest that human beings can be divided into subspecies, some of 
which are morally, intellectually, and physically inferior to others.”14 
all things considered, a race-based classification in medicine is a crude 
and inadequate way to assign particular medical treatments, and may 
fail to treat patients properly.15
Because of these significant issues, the Journal of Health & Life Sciences 
Law  features this two-part series on the topic of personalized or “patient-
tailored medicine.” in Part one, the authors addressed the relevance 
of genetic information, and how race and genetics have affected and 
may impact the development of medicines, pharmacogenomics, and 
personalized medicine in the united states.16 Part two examines 
current and proposed federal and state laws and regulations intended 
to protect individuals from the misuse of genetic information, including 
uses that discriminate based on genetic predispositions. this Part next 
explores the potential for litigation against both manufacturers and 
providers, as well as potential defenses. the authors also discuss legal 
issues relating to research that relies on the use of genetic information. 
in sum, this Part examines the significant legal and ethical issues 
facing the future of personalized medicine that tailors patient clinical 
therapies based on the results of genetic testing.
Federal legal landscape
federal laws specifically addressing personalized medicine are a 
relatively new topic of discussion. even before congress enacted laws 
aimed specifically against genetic discrimination, some commentators 
interpreted other non-discrimination laws to include genetic discrimi-
nation. these include the health insurance and Portability act of 
1996 (hiPaa), the american with Disabilities act (aDa) of 1990, and 
title Vii of the civil rights act of 1964. other laws and pronounce-
ments address the use of genetic information more directly, such as the 
Genetic information nondiscrimination act (Gina) and a 2000 exec-
utive order prohibiting use of federal employees’ genetic information 
in employment decisions.17 the food and Drug administration (fDa) 
13 iNSt. of med., tHe uNequal BurdeN of caNcer: aN aSSeSSmeNt of NiH reSearcH aNd ProGramS for 
etHNic miNoritieS aNd tHe medically uNderServed 38 (M. Alfred Haynes & Brian D. Smedley 
eds. 1999).
14 Sharona Hoffman, “Racially-Tailored” Medicine Unraveled, 55 am. u. l. rev. 395, 409 
(2005) [hereinafter “Racially-Tailored” Medicine].
15 M. Gregg Bloche, Race-Based Therapeutics, 351 New eNG. J. med. 2035, 2036 (2004).
16 Patient-Tailored Medicine, Part One.
17 Human Genome Project Info., Genetics Privacy and Legislation: GINA Becomes Law 
May 2008, www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/legislat.shtml  
(last visited June 5, 2008) [hereinafter GINA Becomes Law].
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plays a key role in advancing personalized medicine, conducting 
discussions, and convening debate about the implications for drug 
development and regulatory review. Questions include issues such as 
how narrowly clinical trials should be designed and whether efficacy is 
defined in different ways for different genetic subgroups.18 the federal 
government faces issues related to the reimbursement and payment 
of personalized medicines as well. Public and private payers will have 
new and complex questions, such as whether therapies should be reim-
bursed only for those patients who are identified as likely to respond to 
treatment.19 the following sections explore these issues.
HIPAA
the health insurance Portability and accountability act of 1996 
provides, among other things, for the portability of health insurance 
by ensuring that individuals who change health coverage do not have 
new employment-related coverage denied or restricted on the basis 
of preexisting conditions.20 Before the Genetic information nondis-
crimination act was passed in 2008, hiPaa was the only federal law 
that directly addressed genetic discrimination.21 the portion of hiPaa 
addressing portability of health insurance (hiPaa Portability rule) 
prohibits insurers who provide health coverage for a group of fifty or 
more individuals from denying an applicant for health reasons, includ-
ing reasons related to genetic information.22 (the hiPaa Privacy rule, 
also part of the hiPaa legislation enacted in 1996, will be addressed 
below under Privacy protections and issues for providers.) hiPaa also 
limits exclusions for preexisting conditions in group health plans to 
twelve months, and it prohibits exclusions if an individual was covered 
previously for that condition for at least twelve months.23
the hiPaa Portability rule was the first federal law to address use of 
genetic information in the health insurance context. it prohibits group 
health plans and group health insurers from imposing a pre existing 
condition exclusion on the basis of genetic information unless there 
is an actual diagnosis of the condition related to the genetic informa-
tion.24 hiPaa also prohibits establishing eligibility requirements for any 
individual based on genetic information or other health-status factors. 
health insurers in the small-group market, employers with between two 
and fifty employees, may not refuse to issue a policy on the basis of the 
18 Personalized Medicine 101.
19 Id.
20 29 U.S.C. § 1181; 42 U.S.C. § 300gg; 26 U.S.C. § 9801.
21 GINA Becomes Law.
22 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181, 1002(7); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg; 26 U.S.C. § 9801.
23 GINA Becomes Law.
24 29 U.S.C. § 1181(b)(1)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(b)(1)(B); 26 U.S.C. § 9801(b)(1)(B).
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genetic information of any enrollee or any potential enrollee.25 insur-
ers in both the small and large group markets may not refuse to renew 
a policy based on genetic information about an enrollee or a potential 
enrollee.26
nonetheless, the hiPaa Portability rule was narrowly drawn. as 
noted in a report commissioned by the secretary’s advisory commit-
tee on Genetics, health, and society, “hiPaa does not restrict a group 
health plan or issuer from requesting, purchasing, or otherwise obtain-
ing genetic information about an individual or [from] requiring an 
individual to submit to a genetic test as a condition of coverage …”27 
nor does it prohibit the group health plan or issuer from charging 
all members of the group higher premiums based on the information 
obtained.28
further, hiPaa does not prohibit employers from refusing to offer 
health coverage as part of their benefits package. in addition, the 
applicability of the preexisting condition exclusion and nondiscrimi-
nation provisions do not apply to individual health insurance policies, 
very small plans, retiree-only coverage, and self-insured non-federal 
government plans.29 lastly, the hiPaa Portability provisions do not 
address the issues raised by gathering and using genetic information 
in the workplace outside the health insurance context.30 
ADA
the americans with Disabilities act prohibits employment, public 
services, public accommodations, and communications discrimi-
nation against individuals with disabilities.31 although title i of the 
aDa, enforced by the equal employment opportunity commission 
(eeoc), does not explicitly address genetic information, it does pro-
vide some protection against disability-related genetic discrimination 
in the workplace.32
25 45 C.F.R. § 146.150.
26 Id. § 146.152.
27 Robert B. Lanman, office of BiotecH. activitieS, Nat’l iNStS. of HealtH, aN aNalySiS  
of tHe adequacy of curreNt law iN ProtectiNG aGaiNSt GeNetic diScrimiNatioN  
iN HealtH iNSuraNce aNd emPloymeNt: a rePort commiSSioNed By tHe Secretary’S  
adviSory committee oN GeNeticS, HealtH, aNd Society i (2005), available at  
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/legal_analysis_May2005.pdf  
[hereinafter SacGHS rePort].
28 Id. GINA does prohibit this, however, as discussed below.
29 Interim Final Rules for Nondiscrimination in Heath Coverage in the Group Market, 
66 Fed. Reg. 1378, 1379 (Jan. 8, 2001); see also Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Genetic  
Discrimination and the Workplace: Employee’s Right to Privacy v. Employer’s  
Need to Know, 39 am. BuS. l.J. 139, 166–67 (2001).
30 See SacGHS rePort, at 4.
31 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213. 
32 GINA Becomes Law. 
Diversity Council: Patient-Tailored Medicine
Journal of Health & Life Sciences Law Vol. 2, No. 2
10
the aDa defines the term “disability” with respect to an individual 
as a person having:
(a) a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more of the major life activities of 
such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(c) being regarded as having such impairment.33 
although this language does not reference genetic traits, con-
gressional debates in 1990 touched on the issue; however, congress 
apparently left it in the hands of the eeoc.34 in March 1995, the 
eeoc issued an interpretation of the aDa that states: “entities that 
discriminate on the basis of genetic predisposition are regarding the 
individuals as having impairments, and such individuals are covered by 
the aDa.”35 this interpretation constitutes policy guidance that “does 
not have the same legal binding effect on a court as a statute or regula-
tion ….”36 Because the interpretation has yet to be tested in the legal 
arena, it remains simply interpretive policy guidance.37
title iii of the americans with Disabilities act applies to private 
businesses, and provides that no individual shall be discriminated 
against on the basis of disability in the full enjoyment of the goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any 
place of public accommodation. however, the united states circuit 
court of appeals has found that this nondiscrimination provision does 
not apply to insurance policies.38
finally, the “safe harbor provision” of the aDa, which provides that 
the aDa’s provisions must not be interpreted to prohibit or restrict an 
insurer from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering risks 
consistent with state law, has been construed in favor of insurers.39
33 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) –(C).
34 Nancy Lee Jones & Amanda K. Sarata, crS rePort for coNGreSS—GeNetic iNformatioN:  
leGal iSSueS relatiNG to diScrimiNatioN aNd Privacy 1 (Mar. 10, 2008), available at  
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL30006_20080310.pdf [hereinafter crS rePort].
35 GINA Becomes Law.
36 Id.
37 See, e.g., United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966) 
(preclusion principles apply to administrative proceedings [only] when the administra-
tive agency in the first action was “acting in a judicial capacity” and the parties had an 
adequate opportunity to present their case); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 
587 (2000) (agency interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, 
and enforcement guidelines all lack the force of law).
38 SacGHS rePort, at 5 –6.
39 Id. at 6.
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
title Vii of the civil rights act prohibits all private employers with 
15 or more workers, labor organizations, employment agencies, and 
federal, state, and municipal government employers from discriminat-
ing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.40 the 
statute does not specifically address discrimination based on genetic 
discrimination, but title Vii may protect against discrimination on the 
basis of an individual’s genetic makeup if that discrimination dispro-
portionately impacts individuals belonging to a protected class. for 
example, if an employer refuses to hire an individual who is a carrier 
of the genetic mutation for tay-sachs disease, it is arguable that the 
employer is discriminating against persons with an eastern european 
jewish ethnic background, which would constitute prohibited dispa-
rate impact on the basis of national origin.41 however, protection is 
available only where an employer engages in discrimination based on 
a genetic trait substantially related to a particular race or ethnic group, 
and there have been only a few diseases where such a strong relation-
ship has been proven.42
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
it is difficult to imagine information more personal 
or more private than a person’s genetic makeup … 
if congress fails to make sure that genetic informa-
tion is used only for legitimate purposes, we may well 
squander the vast potential of genetic research to 
improve the nation’s health.43 
these words were spoken by Mass achusetts senator edward Ken-
nedy on january 22, 2007, in his introductory remarks to the senate 
regarding the Genetic information nondiscrimination act. on May 21, 
2008—13 years after the legislation was initially introduced—senator 
Kennedy’s words and concerns were implemented into law when Presi-
dent Bush signed Gina.44
congress had been attempting to pass federal protections against 
genetic discrimination for over a decade. although Gina passed over-
whelmingly, there had been ongoing debates over the need for such 
40 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-e17; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
41 SacGHS rePort.
42 GINA Becomes Law.
43 Introductory Remarks of Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) on the Genetic  
Information Nondiscrimination Act 1, 1–2 (Jan. 22, 2007), available at  
www.geneticalliance.org/ksc_assets/publicpolicy/gina_remarks_kennedy.pdf.
44 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 
(2008) [hereinafter GINA]. GINA becomes effective in November 2009.
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federal legislation.45 opponents noted that more than forty states pro-
hibited genetic discrimination in health insurance, and more than 
thirty states prohibited genetic discrimination in the workplace. they 
also argued that the hiPaa Portability rule and the aDa provided 
sufficient protection from genetic discrimination, making Gina super-
fluous legislation. according to Gina’s opponents, ample safeguards 
already were in place to prevent genetic discrimination.46
Despite these efforts, the law passed by an overwhelming majority in 
the house of representatives (414–1) and unanimously in the senate. 
the law amends title Vii, hiPaa, the employee retirement income 
security act of 1974 (erisa), the Public health service act, the inter-
nal revenue code of 1986 (irc), and title XViii (Medicare) of the 
social security act, which collectively apply to group health plans with 
any number of participants and health insurance issuers underwrit-
ing the plans’ benefits.47 further, Gina applies to issuers of health 
insurance policies in the individual markets,48 as well as to issuers of 
“Medi-Gap” insurance policies, which supplement health coverage 
available under the Medicare program.49 the net result is that virtually 
all health insurers are subject to Gina’s nondiscrimination prohibi-
tion. significantly, because Gina does not preempt existing state laws, 
counsel must continue to identify state laws that offer greater protec-
tions.50 Gina’s preemption provision does not override state laws that 
provide equal or greater protection against genetic discrimination, 
and this likely will complicate compliance because of differing state 
and federal standards.51
Gina fills in many of the perceived gaps in protection under 
hiPaa. in addition to defining “genetic information” broadly,52 Gina 
addresses discrimination in the workplace as well as in the health insur-
ance arena. not only does it prohibit both employers and group health 
plans from discriminating on the basis of “genetic information,”53 it 
also limits the ability of employers and group health plans to collect 
genetic information.54
45 GINA Becomes Law.
46 Id.
47 29 U.S.C. § 1182(e); 26 U.S.C. § 9801(e); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(b). See Marian Waldmann 
et al., New Federal Law Regulates Collection and Use of Genetic Information by Employers 
and Group Health Plans, 7 BNa Privacy & Security l. reP. 764–69, May 19, 2008  
[hereinafter BNA].
48 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-51.
49 GINA, tit. 1, § 104.
50 Id., tit. 2, § 209(3).
51 Kevin P. McGowan, Employer Advocates Remain Wary of New Bias Law’s Potential Effects, 
BNa daily laBor rePort No. 99 (May 22, 2008).
52 GINA, tit. 1 §§ 101(6), 102(d)(4)(16), 103(d)(7), 104(3)(B); id. tit. 2 § 201(4). 
53 See id. tit. 1 §§ 101(a), 102(a); id. tit. 2 § 202(a).
54 Id. tit. 1 §§ 101(b), 102(d); id. tit. 2 § 202(b).
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Gina expands title Vii by imposing broad restrictions on the col-
lection, use, and disclosure of genetic information in the employment 
context.55 Gina applies to all employers, employment agencies, labor 
organizations, and joint labor-management committees subject to 
title Vii, and defines “genetic information” as not only the genetic tests 
of employees and their family members, but also any “manifestation of 
a disease or disorder” in the employee’s family members.56 further, the 
statute defines “family member” very expansively; it includes not only 
the employee’s dependents, but also relatives of the employee, or of the 
employee’s dependents, from the first to the fourth degree.57 in other 
words, information about the employee’s father, grand father, great-
grandfather, and great-great-grandfather would constitute genetic 
information for purposes of Gina.
Gina imposes three principal restrictions on employers with 
respect to genetic information. first, employers cannot discriminate in 
the terms or conditions of employment based upon genetic informa-
tion.58 second, employers may not retaliate against an employee who 
opposes genetic discrimination.59 third, except in certain situations 
described below, employers cannot collect genetic information about 
an employee, or an employee’s family member, whether by request, 
mandatory disclosure, or purchase from a third party.60
the restriction on collecting genetic information has several excep-
tions. Gina allows employers to request or require disclosure of a 
family member’s genetic information, including manifested diseases 
or disorders, to comply with the family and Medical leave act and 
with state family and medical leave laws.61 in addition, employers may 
offer “genetic services” as an employee benefit. to qualify, an employee 
must provide prior, voluntary, and written authorization for disclosure 
of genetic information to the service provider.62
Gina incorporates title Vii provisions with respect to enforcement. 
for instance, employees must exhaust all administrative remedies 
before filing a lawsuit, and damages are subject to the same restrictions 
55 The DOE Human Genome Project observed that genetic predisposition or conditions 
can lead to workplace discrimination, even in cases where workers are healthy and 
unlikely to develop a disease, or where the genetic condition has no effect on the abil-
ity to perform work. GINA Becomes Law.
56 GINA, tit. 1, § 101(a), (d).
57 Id. § 101(d)(5).
58 GINA, tit. 2, § 202(a)(1).
59 Id. § 207(f ).
60 Id. § 202(b).
61 Id. § 202(b)(3).
62 Id. § 202(b)(2)(B).
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as under title Vii.63 however, unlike title Vii, Gina does not permit 
claims to be brought on a disparate impact theory.64 
Gina prohibits insurance companies from discriminating against 
individuals based on information derived from genetic tests.65 Group 
health plans and insurance issuers cannot adjust contribution amounts 
or premiums for the group based on the genetic information of any 
plan participant. Gina prohibits insurance providers from requesting 
or requiring that individuals or their family members undergo genetic 
tests and from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic informa-
tion for underwriting purposes or prior to an individual’s enrollment. 
Despite the expansive scope of Gina’s discrimination provisions 
relating to health insurance, neither Gina nor any other federal law 
addresses discrimination with respect to other insurance products, 
including life insurance, disability insurance, and long-term care insur-
ance. Questions that arise include:
1. whether insurance companies may require applicants to dis-
close genetic testing information;
2. whether applicants are required to disclose genetic testing 
information on an application; and 
3. whether genetic testing information may be used for underwrit-
ing purposes or for denying coverage.
there are differing opinions as to the potential for discrimination 
in the life insurance industry. some argue that it would be more actu-
arially fair for insurers to have access to genetic testing results, while 
others argue that having the test results would not make a significant 
difference. a medical director of an insurance company posed the 
question, “[i]s it more ‘fair’ to require low-risk individuals to make 
what is in effect an involuntary and non-tax-deductible donation to 
help fund death benefits of others at a higher risk?”66
in reality, the use of genetic information in life insurance underwriting 
is not a novel concept. life insurers generally ask applicants about their 
family medical history, revealing genetic information as defined under 
Gina.67 in fact, a positive test result might have a negligible impact 
on premiums or eligibility, because the insurance company would 
have taken the predisposition into account through the family history 
63 Id. § 207(a).
64 Id. § 208(a).
65 Id. § 102(a)(1).
66 William Nowlan, A Rational View of Insurance and Genetic Discrimination,  
297 Sci. 195 (2002).
67 Yann Joly et al., Genetic Information and Life Insurance: A “Real” Risk?,  
11 eur. J. Hum. GeNeticS 561 (2003).
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questionnaire.68 of course, a positive test result more specifically identifies 
an individual’s genetic risk factors than would a family history.
the passage of Gina represents progress in the protection of 
genetic testing and personalized medicine and, while it is not perfect, 
it provides a number of safeguards, such as protecting individuals who 
have a genetic predisposition or have been diagnosed with a disease.69 
further, by prohibiting insurers and employers from requiring genetic 
tests and using genetic information to discriminate, Gina provides the 
groundwork for additional federal and local protections against genetic 
discrimination and supports the use of personalized medicine.
Executive Order protecting federal employees
on february 8, 2000, President clinton signed an executive order 
prohibiting every federal department and agency from using genetic 
information in any hiring or promotion action.70 this executive order, 
endorsed by the american Medical association, american college of 
Medical Genetics, national society of Genetic counselors, and the 
Genetic alliance:
•	 Prohibits	 federal	 employers	 from	 requiring	 or	 requesting	
genetic tests as a condition of being hired or receiving benefits. 
employers cannot request or require employees to undergo 
genetic tests to evaluate an employee’s ability to perform his or 
her job.
•	 Prohibits	federal	employers	from	using	protected	genetic	infor-
mation to classify employees in a manner that deprives them of 
advancement opportunities. employers cannot deny employees 
promotions or overseas posts because of a genetic predisposi-
tion for certain illnesses.
•	 Provides	strong	privacy	protections	for	any	genetic	information	
used for medical treatment and research. obtaining or disclosing 
genetic information about employees or potential employees is 
prohibited, except when necessary to provide medical treatment 
to employees, ensure workplace health and safety, or provide 
occupational and health researchers access to data. in every case 
where genetic information about employees is obtained, it will 
be subject to all federal and state privacy protections. 
68 Mark A. Rothstein & Mary R. Anderlik, What Is Genetic Discrimination, and When and 
How Can It Be Prevented?, 5 GeNeticS med. 354 (2001).
69 H.R. 493, S. 358.
70 Exec. Order, To Prohibit Discrimination in Federal Employment Based on Genetic  
Information (Feb. 8, 2000), available at www.opm.gov/pressrel/2000/genetic_eo.htm.
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Food and Drug Administration
although personalized medicine is an exciting phenomenon that 
has the potential of revolutionizing medicine, many obstacles remain.71 
as discussed in detail in Part one of this series, clinical trials for drug 
safety and effectiveness often fail to include minority participants. 
according to fDa, participation of african-americans in clinical trials 
declined from 12 to 6% from 1995 to 1999.72 as a result of this lack of 
participation, much is unknown about the way in which an individual 
of an under-included ethnic background will react to certain medica-
tions. this prevents fDa from accurately providing information about 
the efficacy, safety, and usage of drugs for those populations. as a result, 
when physicians prescribe drugs to underrepresented populations it is 
often difficult for them to know how effective or harmful a particular 
drug will be to a particular individual.73
as described in detail in Part one of this series,74 fDa’s recent 
involvement with personalized medicine was demonstrated in the 
african-american heart failure trial (a-heft). in 2005, BiDil was 
approved by fDa for treating heart failure in african-americans 
based on the results of the a-heft trial. this was the first time that 
fDa approved a therapy for a specific racial group. a number of sci-
entific and policy concerns have arisen as a result,75 notably that the 
“differential drug response” has not been sufficiently tested. the fDa 
responded that its approval of BiDil to treat heart failure in african-
american patients, but not white patients, was scientifically reasonable 
and data-based.76 from a policy point of view, the approval suggests 
that racially specific drugs might be at least part of the solution to the 
problem of racial disparities in health in the united states, thereby 
minimizing the broad public health issues associated with disparities 
and socio-economic status.
treatment for hiV disease may provide another opportunity for 
personalized medicine. Discoveries of anti-hiV drugs have brought the 
potential armamentarium of treatments to more than twenty agents in 
four drug groups.77 a number of studies dealing with anti-hiV drugs 
71 Neal Learner, The Promise of Personalized Medicine Is Exciting, but Barriers Remain, 
Along with Questions About How to Achieve ROI, aiS HealtH, May 16, 2008, available at  
www.aishealth.com/Bnow/hbd051608.html [hereinafter Promise of Personalized Medicine]. 
72 Vivek K. Murthy et al., Participation in Cancer Clinical Trials: Race-, Sex-, and Age-Based 
Disparities, 291 Jama 2720 (2004).
73 Promise of Personalized Medicine, at 5.
74 Patient-Tailored Medicine, Part One, at 29, 30.
75 Kirsten Bibbins-Domingo & Alicia Fernandez, BiDil for Heart Failure in Black Patients: 
Implications of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration Approval, 146 aNNalS iNterNal med. 
52 (2007).
76 Robert Temple & Norman L. Stockbridge, BiDil for Heart Failure in Black Patients:  
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration Perspective, 146 aNNalS iNterNal med. 57 (2007).
77 Tim R. Cressey & Marc Lallemant, Pharmacogenetics of Antiretroviral Drugs for the Treat-
ment of HIV-Infected Patients: An Update, 7 iNfectioN, GeNeticS & evolutioN 333–42 (2007).
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have indicated that genetic polymorphisms (polymorphisms are genetic 
variants that appear in at least one percent of a population) may play 
a role in both toxicity and response to treatment,78 but only one study 
specifically designed to test this hypothesis has been carried out with 
anti-hiV drugs. in that study, it was shown that there are race/ethnic-
specific differences in plasma lipid levels.79 
thus, for moral and policy reasons, the fDa has recognized the 
need to foster race-based therapies. significantly, the fDa advisory 
committee asserted that a major rationale for approving BiDil was the 
“moral[ ] imperative” to remedy long-standing and “significant health 
disparities among blacks.”80 african-americans and other racial and 
ethnic minorities suffer disproportionately from heart disease, cancer, 
diabetes, and hiV.81 all of these groups suffer unique healthcare dis-
parities that could be remedied by tailored therapies.82
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and Medicare Part D
in addition to treatment difficulties that result from a paucity of 
information about minority populations’ reactions to particular 
medications, cost concerns arise. as innovations make possible more 
extensive treatment on an individual basis than ever before, health 
financing systems fail to address the rising costs of personalized medi-
cine, particularly for minority populations.
in policies related to medical treatments, particularly pharmaceu-
ticals, cost and quality of healthcare are inextricably linked. in the 
past several years, congress has enacted significant bills related to 
drug payments for Medicare beneficiaries that may affect the ability of 
minorities to access patient-tailored medicine. on December 8, 2003, 
congress enacted the Medicare Prescription Drug, improvement, 
and Modernization act,83 a prescription drug benefit for Medicare 
beneficiaries. this legislation prohibited the Medicare program from 
bargaining with pharmaceutical companies to lower the prices of pre-
scription drugs. under the 2003 law, private prescription drug plans 
(PDPs) rather than government agencies became responsible for mod-
78 Id.
79 Andrea S. Foulkes et al., Associations Among Race/Ethnicity, ApoC-III Genotypes, and 
Lipids in HIV-1-Infected Individuals on Antiretroviral Therapy, 3 PloS med. e52 (2006).  
For a more detailed explanation, see Patient-Tailored Medicine, Part One, at 29, 30.
80 Sandra Soo-Jin Lee, Racializing Drug Design: Implications of Pharmacogenomics for 
Health Disparities, 95 am. J. PuB. HealtH 2133, 2137 (2005). 
81 See generally Michael B. Losow, Personalized Medicine & Race-Based Drug Development: 
Addressing Minority Health Care Disparities in an Ethically Charged Area, 20 St. JoHN’S J. 
leGal commeNt. 15, 16–17 (2005).
82 Id.
83 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, & Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
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erating drug plans.84 the prices that PDPs establish directly affect the 
costs that Medicare beneficiaries—and taxpayers, who pay for three-
fourths of Medicare Part D—incur.85
under the Medicare Part D benefit, use of preferred drug lists 
(PDls) is a rapidly expanding phenomenon86 in which providers 
attempt to save money on prescription drugs by providing only “pre-
ferred” medications. while individuals with private health insurance 
may enjoy more personalized care in pharmaceutical treatment, 
restrictive formularies and PDls may cause difficulties for individu-
als from minority groups who receive Medicare, Medicaid, and other 
health insurance.87 studies have shown that the use of PDls often can 
result in negative health outcomes.88 Minority populations likely will 
feel these negative effects more profoundly than their non-minority 
counterparts.89 Because clinical trials often fail to include representa-
tion of minority groups, there tends to be a paucity of clinical trial data 
about the efficacy of drug treatments for these populations. Due to this 
lack of information, physicians would need greater latitude to deter-
mine the best course of treatment for minority patients. 
Governments generally choose to contain costs rather than spend 
necessary funds to ensure that minority patients receive the best treat-
ment.90 as a result, minority populations, the individuals who would 
benefit most from personal health assessments, are least likely to receive 
individualized care. even if drugs are designed to address the unique 
medical needs of minority populations, individuals likely will not have 
access to specialized medications, as it is unlikely that Medicare Part D 
will cover the high costs of unique drugs. Medicare Part D provides:
if a Part D plan sponsor maintains a formulary tier in 
which it places very high cost and unique items, such as 
genomic and biotech products, the sponsor may design 
its exception process so that very high cost or unique 
drugs are not eligible for a tiering exception.91 
84 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-111. See Gary A. Puckrein et al., Nat’l miNority HealtH moNtH fouNd., 
druG PriceS aNd tHe emerGiNG maJority: SHould GoverNmeNt NeGotiate druG PriceS? 3, available 
at www.nmhmf.org/issuebrief.pdf [hereinafter druG PriceS aNd tHe emerGiNG maJority].
85 Id. at iv. 
86 In 2003, 29 states had obtained legislative approval to institute a preferred drug list 
(PDL). Mary Kay Owens, Nat’l PHarm. couNcil, State medicaid ProGram iSSueS: Preferred druG 
liStS 1 (2004), available at www.npcnow.org/resources/PDFs/PDLbrief.pdf.
87 druG PriceS aNd tHe emerGiNG maJority.
88 Matthew M. Murawski & Tamer Abdelgawad, Exploration of the Impact of Preferred Drug 
Lists on Hospital and Physician Visits and the Costs to Medicaid, 11 am. J. maNaGed care 
SP35 (2005).
89 Alvin Headen & Neal Masia, Exploring the Potential Link Between Medicaid Access Restric-
tions, Physician Location, and Health Disparities, 11 am. J. maNaGed care SP21 (2005).
90 druG PriceS aNd tHe emerGiNG maJority.
91 42 C.F.R. § 423.578(a)(7). See Pi-Yi Mayo, Medicare Part D, HouStoN law., May/June 2006, 
available at www.thehoustonlawyer.com/aa_may06/page22.htm. 
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failing to address the unique health needs of minorities not only 
will affect disadvantaged individuals negatively, but also will affect the 
entire american population negatively in the long run. Minority popu-
lations tend to receive health treatment later in the disease progression 
than their non-minority counterparts. as a result, when minorities do 
receive treatment, the financial cost may be much greater.92 thus, 
from a societal perspective, treatment at a later stage puts a much 
greater strain on the health system. while disadvantaged populations 
will “bear the immediate burden of those decisions,”93 ultimately the 
entire population will be affected by inequities in treatment and dis-
parate understanding of the health needs of minority populations.
Despite potential drawbacks and cost-containment concerns, per-
sonalized medicine has the potential of improving drug delivery and 
optimizing spending on pharmaceuticals. according to robert epstein, 
M.D., chief Medical officer at Medico health solutions: 
we think it is one of the key ways to manage drug 
expenditures in the near future. Because you can 
move beyond the debate of unit costs to who is really 
supposed to be taking the drugs, and who is really 
going to benefit from it, and who is really going to 
have a bad side effect. if you can take those cuts out, 
using science, you’re going to definitely save money 
and improve effectiveness.94 
if personalized medicine does, in fact, improve efficiency and 
improve spending for drug treatments, then initial increases in drug 
costs will be worth the investment in the long run.
State legislative landscape
states have a patchwork of genetic-information nondiscrimination 
laws, none of them comprehensive.95 state laws differ in coverage, pro-
tections afforded, and enforcement mechanisms.96 in 1991, wisconsin 
became the first state to enact a comprehensive law prohibiting discrim-
ination based on genetic test results. currently, at least 34 states and 
the District of columbia have enacted laws prohibiting some form of 
92 Kristi V. Mizelle, StudeNt NatioNal medical aSSociatioN: miNority HealtH diSParitieS PoSitioNS StatemeNt 
(2002), available at www.snma.org/downloads/snma_minority_health_disparities.pdf.
93 druG PriceS aNd tHe emerGiNG maJority, at ii.
94 Neal Learner, The Promise of Personalized Medicine Is Exciting, but Barriers Remain,  
Along with Questions About How to Achieve ROI, aiS HealtH, May 16, 2008,  
available at www.aishealth.com/Bnow/hbd051608.html.
95 More information on state-specific genetics bills is available from the National Conference 
of State Legislatures at www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/geneticsDB.cfm.
96 See crS rePort.
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genetic discrimination in employment.97 although the scope and func-
tion of these laws vary widely, they all prohibit discrimination based on 
the results of genetic tests. Many extend the protections to inherited 
characteristics, including family history and family member test results. 
Most states restrict employers from accessing genetic information; some 
prohibit employers from requesting, requiring, and obtaining genetic 
information or test results, albeit with exceptions for situations such as 
identifying individuals who may be a safety risk in the workplace.98
some states extend protections against genetic discrimination to 
healthcare and other contexts. Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, rhode 
island, and texas explicitly prohibit medical facilities from providing 
discriminatory medical treatment. other states have Patients’ Bills of 
rights that “prohibit race discrimination in health care,” or prohibit 
discrimination in distribution of state services.
forty-seven states have enacted laws pertaining to the use of genetic 
information in health insurance.99 these states generally prohibit
•	 using	genetic	information	to	determine	eligibility,
•	 using	genetic	information	to	set	premiums	for	risk	selection	and	
risk classification,
•	 requiring	genetic	testing	of	applicants,	or
•	 disclosing	genetic	information	without	consent.100 
however, state laws do not govern the use of genetic information 
in employer-sponsored health benefit plans, which are exempt from 
state insurance laws due to erisa preemption.101 as it has been esti-
mated that more than one-third of the employed insured population is 
insured through self-funded plans, the erisa exemption significantly 
limits the application of these state laws.102
fewer states have enacted laws restricting the use of genetic informa-
tion in life, disability, and long-term care insurance. for example, only 
seven states prohibit genetic discrimination in life insurance without actu-
97 These states include Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See NCSL, State Genetics Employment 
Laws, available at www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndiscrim.htm (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2008).
98 Id.
99 NCSL, Genetics and Health Insurance State Anti-Discrimination Laws, available at  
www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndishlth.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
100 Id.
101 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1145.
102 crS rePort, at 21 (citing Kathy L. Hudson et. al., Genetic Discrimination and Health Insurance: 
An Urgent Need for Reform, 270 Sci. 391 (1995) and Karen H. Rothenberg, Genetic Informa-
tion and Health Insurance: State Legislative Approaches, 23 J. l. med. & etHicS 312 (1995).
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arial justification.103 three states also prohibit genetic discrimination in 
disability insurance without actuarial justification.104 only three states pro-
hibit genetic discrimination in disability and long-term care insurance.105
some commentators believe that before personalized medicine can 
be fully realized, there is a need for new regulatory approaches and 
stronger patient privacy protection laws.106 however, despite the differing 
state approaches to genetic discrimination, Gina goes a long way—as it 
was intended to do—in providing a federal floor of protection against 
discrimination to allow personalized medicine to continue to evolve.
litigation Challenges and Trends
this section describes manufacturer and provider liabilities, litigation 
risks, and protections when dealing with patient-tailored medicines.
Manufacturers’ risks
roadblocks and impediments on the path toward personalized med-
icine continue to persist. Personalized medicine represents only a very 
small portion of the healthcare sector, where “blockbuster drugs” are 
still defined as $1-billion-a-year sellers that target the largest number of 
patients with a disease. thus, tailoring drugs to particular individuals 
poses a challenge to traditional pharmaceutical companies by suggest-
ing that new drugs will target smaller populations.107 this focus on 
genetic information raises numerous cost and ethical concerns, which 
may create new risks of liability for manufacturers.
Inadequate warning liability
in the most common type of tort suit against pharmaceutical manu-
facturers, the plaintiff asserts a drug company is liable for failing to warn 
consumers of dangers that the company itself should have foreseen 
and disclosed.108 Personalized medicine would subject manufacturers 
103 The seven states are Arizona, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, 
and New Mexico. See NCSL, Genetics and Life, Disability and Long-term Care Insurance, 
available at www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndislife.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 
2008).
104 The states are Arizona, Maine, and New Jersey. Id.
105 These states are Massachusetts, Montana, and New Mexico. Id.
106 Jacqueline Risher, Personalized Medicine: The Promise and Realities  
of Healthcare Tailored to You, Suite101.com, June 22, 2008,  
http://healthfieldmedicare.suite101.com/article.cfm/personalized_medicine  
(last visited Nov. 3, 2008).
107 Rick Mullin, Armed with the Decoded Human Genome, Drug Researchers and Clinicians 
Are Working to Close the Gap Between Patient and Therapy, 86 cHemical & eNGiNeeriNG  
NewS 17 (2008), available at http://pubs.acs.org/cen/coverstory/86/8606cover.html.
108 Bernard J. Garbutt & Melinda E. Hofmann, Recent Developments in Pharmaceutical 
Products Liability Law: Failure to Warn, the Learned Intermediary Defense, and Other Issues 
in the New Millennium, 58 food & druG l.J. 269 (2003) [hereinafter Recent Developments 
in Pharmaceutical Products Liability Law]. 
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to heightened duties to disclose risks to consumers, and to provide 
clear instructions to providers.
in an environment of patient-tailored medicines, manufacturers 
of race/ethnicity-based therapies would be expected to know the risks 
peculiar to the differentiated populations for which they develop and 
market pharmaceuticals. thus, a “manufacturer may face liability if 
[clinical] data show that certain genotypes are more susceptible to 
adverse side effects to a drug that is subsequently marketed without 
adequate genetic warnings.”109
the basic premise of race/ethnicity-based therapies is that they are 
safer and more effective than other drugs for particular genomic popu-
lations. in the past, courts did not recognize inadequate warning claims 
by hypersensitive individuals and small groups because a manufacturer 
could not have known of those rare risks. Pharmacogenomic research 
changes that rationale.110 now, courts are more likely to impose greater 
duties upon manufacturers to warn consumers of risks revealed by 
advances in pharmacogenomic research. for example, a class action 
suit involving the manufacturer of lYMerix, a lyme disease vaccine, 
alleged that the drug manufacturer should have known about pecu-
liar risks presented by the drug for only 30 percent of the population. 
rather than fight in court, the manufacturer agreed to a settlement 
and withdrew the vaccine.111
the history of healthcare disparities in the united states, discussed 
in Part one of this series, may contribute to expanded liability as well. 
race-based therapies likely will result in increased litigation for inad-
equate warnings, precisely because the therapies are targeted toward 
populations that traditionally have been victims of discrimination; it is 
logical to expect that because victims of racism are more likely to be 
apprehensive, they will be more determined to prevent future racial 
discrimination. Manufacturers of these therapies would be prudent 
to ensure as full a level of disclosure of knowable risks as possible to 
minimize potential litigation from the consumers of those therapies. 
on the other hand, failure to adequately apprise consumers of unique 
race-based risks could open drug manufacturers not only to an initial 
wave of litigation from injured consumers, but also to subsequent waves 
of litigation from the compounding effect of negative public relations 
based upon charges of exploitation of vulnerable populations.
109 Id. 
110 Lars Noah, The Coming Pharmacogenomics Revolution: Tailoring Drugs to Fit Patients’ 
Genetic Profiles, 43 JurimetricS J. 1, 25–26 (2002).
111 Gary E. Marchant, Personalized Medicine and the Law, 44 ariz. att’y 12, 16 (2007).
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Design defect liability
Personalized medical care may create a greater likelihood of more 
successful and frequent design defect claims. Personalized medi-
cine and associated genetic screening tests would create a consumer 
expectation that the drugs are designed for individual use. the more 
effective personalized medicine becomes, the more purchasers will 
perceive their care to be on the cutting edge of pharmaceuticals.112 if 
manufacturers know about the benefits of the drugs for a particular 
population, they will be expected to know the risks as well.113
on the other hand, tailored therapies may face fewer liabilities 
related to design defects, based on a risk-utility balancing test that 
considers consumer expectations.114 that is, if a tailored therapy is 
demonstrated to be particularly safe and effective for use by a particu-
lar subgroup of the population, it would present a lower risk of liability 
(even though it would cause adverse side effects in the general popula-
tion). targeted therapies would
•	 pose	lower	risks	to	targeted	demographics	than	drugs	designed	
for the general population, 
•	 have	higher	utility	due	to	 increased	effectiveness	 for	 that	sub-
group, and 
•	 engender	 “reasonable”	 consumer	 expectations	 that	 the	 tai-
lored therapy be only as safe and effective as current market 
alternatives. 
Breach of implied warranty
while plaintiffs’ product liability claims based on a drug’s failure 
to be effective generally have not been successful, in patient-tailored 
medicine, there are compelling rationales for courts to find merit in 
claims based on the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 
a key reason for this shift is the policy goal of assuring that race-based 
therapies and other pharmacogenomic medicines meet expectations 
of being safer than other drugs for the populations to which they adver-
tise. from a legal perspective, race-based therapies will meet the two 
elements of the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose: (1) the 
seller will have knowledge of the consumer’s reasons for purchase (the 
drugs will actually be developed for specific genotypes with specific 
112 Barbara J. Evans, What Will it Take to Reap the Clinical Benefits of Pharmacogenomics?,  
61 food & druG l.J. 753, 792 (2006) (comparing the difference between designing  
pharmacogenomic drugs and traditional drugs to that between a “jet” and a  
“propeller biplane”) [hereinafter Clinical Benefits of Pharmacogenomics].
113 Id.
114 Ellen Wertheimer, The Biter Bit: Unknowable Dangers, The Third Restatement,  
and the Reinstatement of Liability Without Fault, 70 BrooK. l. rev. 889, 925 (2005).
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health problems); and (2) the consumer will rely on the seller’s rep-
resentation, both implicit and otherwise, that the drug is effective as 
marketed (especially due to the perception that these drugs are more 
targeted than traditional drugs).115
Informed consent of research subjects 
there may be potential liability for manufacturers who do not fully 
inform racial and ethnic minority research subjects that they are being 
used to test a commercially viable, race-based drug. as discussed in detail 
in Part one of this series, the tuskegee syphilis experiments created 
a level of distrust towards clinical research by african-americans that 
exists to this day.116 Given this history, race-based medicine researchers 
who do not disclose significant dangers to their participants likely 
would face punitive damages for recklessly endangering the safety of 
minority participants.
“currently, the states are almost evenly split between two types 
of standards for informed consent—the physician-based standard, 
effective in [twenty-five] states, and the patient-based standard, effec-
tive in [twenty-three] states and the District of columbia.”117 under 
both standards, in the treatment context, physicians have a duty to 
inform the patient of all “risks, benefits, and alternatives to treatment” 
that a patient needs to make a decision about his or her course of 
treatment, if any, but the two standards for satisfying that duty are dis-
tinct.118 under the physician-based standard, a physician must provide 
informed consent to a patient “in the same manner that a ‘reasonably 
prudent practitioner’ in the field would.”119 the patient-centered stan-
dard of disclosure requires that information be provided to the patient 
in the manner that “a ‘reasonable patient’ would attach significance 
to in making a treatment decision.”120 the modern, or emerging, stan-
dard for informed consent is the patient-centered standard.121 
Because race-based pharmacogenomic drugs will be on the cutting 
edge of scientific knowledge, it will be difficult for personalized medi-
cine researchers to draft informed consent disclosures that adequately 
identify material risks—but they must do so under both approaches. 
this could result in a blanket permission for genetic research, which 
115 Wayne M. Serra, Ensuring the Safety of Genotech Drugs Through Implied Warranty Theory, 
23 am. J.l. & med. 363, 380–81 (1997).
116 “Racially-Tailored” Medicine, at 426–27.
117 Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case for 
Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 am. J.l. & med. 429, 430 (2006). 
118 Id.
119 Id. (citing Tashman v. Gibbs, 556 S.E.2d 772, 777 (Va. 2002)).
120 Id. 
121 Clinical Benefits of Pharmacogenomics, at 772.
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generally is considered morally problematic.122 however, to the degree 
that jurisdictions with physician-based standards of informed consent 
are more reluctant to impose liability upon physician researchers of tai-
lored therapies, researchers and their employing manufacturers may 
find it advantageous to conduct research from those jurisdictions.
race-based tailored therapy manufacturers also should ensure that 
subjects are fully informed of the commercial potential of any success-
ful outcomes. in a landmark 1990 california case, Moore v. Regents of 
the University of California,123 the supreme court of california imposed 
a duty upon a physician researcher to disclose potentially conflicting 
economic and research interests, citing the physician’s fiduciary duty 
to reveal all material facts relevant to the patient’s decision.124 the 
Moore court also held out the possibility that private companies could 
be liable under a vicarious liability theory, such as respondeat superior, 
for the inadequate disclosure of commercial interests to the research 
subject by failing to disclose that the physician researcher was paid 
by the manufacturer.125 for a broader discussion of genetic research, 
see research and Patient-Tailored medicine, beginning on page 36.
Defenses available to manufacturers
although there are policy justifications for compensating con-
sumers of race-based therapies for personal injuries, there is an even 
greater countervailing need to improve racial minorities’ access to 
drugs. until manufacturers of race-based therapies demonstrate sound 
business models that can pass on liability costs, courts should be care-
ful not to impose crushing awards for technologically innovative drugs. 
it remains to be seen whether race-based therapies will prove to be 
profitable ventures in the short term. for example, BiDil’s initial sales 
projections of $130 million per year never materialized. the drug pro-
duced revenues of $12 million in 2006, over ten times less than the 
goal.126 as a result, BiDil’s manufacturer, nitroMed, has discontinued 
marketing, though it will continue to produce the drug.127 the fol-
lowing sections explore possible defenses for the manufacturers of 
patient-tailored medicines.
122 Richard R. Sharp, The Evolution of Predictive Genetic Testing: Deciphering  
Gene-Environment Interactions, 41 JurimetricS J. 145, 160 (2001).
123 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 133 (1990).
124 Id. at 131–33.
125 Id. at 133.
126 David Armstrong, Nitromed Halts Marketing of Drug, wall St. J., Jan. 16, 2008, at D8.
127 Id.
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FDA preemption
there is a strong possibility that fDa regulation will preempt the 
entire field of pharmaceutical personal injury litigation. in 2008, in Riegel 
v. Medtronic,128 the u.s. supreme court recognized fDa pre emption of 
suits against defective medical devices. the majority opinion rejected 
any state-level liability exposure for defective medical devices that are 
fDa approved.129 Medtronic was resolved based on express preemption 
provisions of the applicable federal statute at issue in the case, i.e., the 
Medical Device amendments of 1976.130 justice scalia, writing for the 
majority, seemed to favor broad fDa preemption of state common law 
tort liability, going so far as to express reservations about allowing fDa 
to define parameters for narrowing the scope of preemption.131 the 
court’s rationale demonstrates the supreme court’s current attitude 
towards fDa preemption in general and is equally applicable to fDa 
preemption of pharmaceutical litigation.
however, the supreme court has not issued a definitive decision 
on whether fDa approval should preempt all state-level personal 
injury litigation against pharmaceutical manufacturers.132 the court 
will decide the issue in the landmark case of Wyeth v. Levine,133 argued 
in november 2008, and possibly preempt the entire area of personal 
injury lawsuits for pharmaceuticals—even though the majority of lower 
courts have been unreceptive to fDa preemption of state-level per-
sonal injury claims.134
courts could become instruments of redistributive justice, forc-
ing innovative pharmaceutical products like race-based therapies to 
exit the market. on the other hand, court decisions could set back 
advancements in the health of americans by depressing sales in tailored 
therapies. the absence of state tort ramifications could encourage risk-
averse companies to enter the pharmacogenomics market.
128 Riegel v. Medtronic, 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008). See Linda Greenhouse et al., Justices  
Shield Medical Devices from Lawsuits, N.y. timeS, Feb. 21, 2008, at 1, available at  
www.nytimes.com/2008/02/21/washington/21device.html [hereinafter Justices Shield 
Medical Devices]. See also Biswajit Chatterjee, Washington Update: Court Rules in Favor of 
FDA Preemption in Medical Devices, 2 HealtH l. & Pol’y 94 (2008) [hereinafter Washington 
Update].
129 Justices Shield Medical Devices. See also Washington Update.
130 Christen L. Young, Agency Preemption Inputs in Riegel v. Medtronic, yale l.J. (online com-
panion), July 9, 2008, available at http://yalelawjournal.org/2008/07/09/young.html. 
131 Id.
132 Warner-Lambert v. Kent, No. 06-1498, 1 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2008), available at  
www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07pdf/06-1498.pdf; see also Washington Update.
133 Wyeth v. Levine, 2006 VT 107 (2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008) (oral argument 
Nov. 3, 2008). Docket available at www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/06-1249.htm. See 
also Gardiner Harris, Court Considers Protecting Drug Makers From Lawsuits, N.y. timeS,  
Feb. 26, 2008, at 1, available at www.nytimes.com/2008/02/26//washington/26drug.html 
[hereinafter Protecting Drug Makers From Lawsuits]; see also Washington Update.
134 Protecting Drug Makers From Lawsuits; see also Washington Update.
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Learned intermediary doctrine
regardless of the outcome on the preemption argument, other 
avenues to mitigate liability remain. a prime pharmaceutical company 
defense against litigation has been the learned intermediary doctrine, 
which undoubtedly will be relied upon in litigation against pharmaco-
genomic drug manufacturers. to date, most personalized medicines 
have been prescription drugs, thereby especially necessitating the doc-
trine’s application.
the learned intermediary doctrine absolves the manufacturer of the 
duty for adequate warnings as long as the company gives direct and ade-
quate warnings to the physician, because the physician has specialized 
knowledge, prescribes the medicines, and advises the patient of appro-
priate medications.135 while most jurisdictions recognize the learned 
intermediary defense, there is an evolving trend among a minority of 
jurisdictions to reject the defense, or to provide exceptions, when the 
manufacturer issues direct-to-consumer (Dtc) advertising.136 
in Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories,137 for example, new jersey’s supreme 
court in 1999 recognized an exception, finding that the underpin-
nings of the learned intermediary doctrine had been chipped away 
by the prevalence of pharmaceutical companies advertising directly to 
consumers, effectively bypassing and negating the traditional physician-
patient treatment relationship.138 in 2007, west Virginia’s supreme 
court followed suit and expanded the Perez holding, rejecting outright 
the learned intermediary doctrine in any situation, largely because of 
Dtc ads.139
Key premises of the learned intermediary doctrine will be inappli-
cable to tailored therapies. a physician will not be acting as a “learned 
intermediary” to nearly the same extent with pharmacogenomic 
drugs because both drug makers and patients will rely less on physi-
cians, and more on manufacturers, to make determinations about 
whether a drug should be prescribed.140 it is likely that manufacturers 
135 Recent Developments in Pharmaceutical Products Liability Law, at 272–73.
136 Id. at 275.
137 Perez v. Wyeth Labs., 734 A.2d 1245 (1999).
138 Recent Developments in Pharmaceutical Products Liability Law, at 273–75. 
139 State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 2007).  
See Nixon Peabody LLP, West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Declines to  
Adopt Learned Intermediary Doctrine in Prescription Drug Failure-to-Warn Case,  
PHarmaceutical, med. device & life SciS. alert (July 2007), available at  
www.nixonpeabody.com/linked_media/publications/JulyAlert.pdf;  
see also Drug & Device Law, In Defense of the Learned Intermediary Rule,  
http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2007/07/in-defense-of-learned-intermediary-rule.html  
(July 6, 2007). 
140 Timothy A. Pratt & John F. Kuckelman, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Direct-to-Con-
sumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, at 7, www.thefederation.org/documents/pratt.htm 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2008) [hereinafter The Learned Intermediary].
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of tailored therapies will engage heavily in Dtc marketing to specific 
population subgroups141—that is, to the self-identified persons of par-
ticular races, ethnicities, and subgroups that a given tailored therapy 
are designed to help. the manufacturers, rather than physicians, will 
have the pharmaco genomic research basis to tailor warnings to spe-
cific subgroups.142
nonetheless, four main rationales for the learned intermediary 
defense continue today: 
[1] prescription drugs remain complex and a physi-
cian must act as a learned intermediary in the process 
of prescribing a drug;
[2]… physicians remain in a superior position 
to convey meaningful information to individual 
patients;
[3]… even though a manufacturer can communicate 
with patients through advertising, a manufacturer 
cannot effectively tailor warnings specifically for 
individual patients … and
[4] requiring a manufacturer to warn a consumer 
directly imposes the manufacturer into the patient-
physician relationship.143 
thus, as for off-label drugs, the learned intermediary doctrine may 
continue to be an especially apt defense to pharmacogenomic drug 
manufacturer liability, as these manufacturers could better shift the 
burdens for proper prescription upon the physician. off-label use of 
ordinary pharmaceuticals is a commonly accepted practice in which 
physicians prescribe drugs to untested subgroups or for untested uses 
not originally approved by fDa.144 a traditional drug that fails to men-
tion use for a given subpopulation does not necessarily mean that the 
drug is unsafe or ineffective.145 for personalized medicines, however, 
physicians may risk malpractice claims for off-label drug recommenda-
tions when adverse side effects occur—off-label use for unapproved 
population groups of pharmacogenomic drugs could connote that the 
nonindicated use would be unsafe or ineffective.146  “for genetically 
targeted therapies, the lack of an approved indication in labeling may 
be “with prejudice,” i.e., it may mean, “this use may be bad,” rather 
141 Alix Weisfeld, How Much Intellectual Property Do the Newest (and Coolest) Biotech-
nologies Get Internationally?, 6 cHi. J. iNt’l l. 833, 836 (2005).
142 The Learned Intermediary, at 7.
143 Id. 
144 Clinical Benefits of Pharmacogenomics, at 783.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 784.
Litigation Challenges and Trends 29
Journal of Health & Life Sciences Law Vol. 2, No. 2
than merely “this use was never tested.”147 as such, physicians should 
tread a careful path in prescribing racially, ethnically, or sex-targeted 
drugs to untested subgroups, and manufacturers should monitor the 
application of the learned intermediary defense in the context of 
patient-tailored drug therapies. 
Provider risks
use of patient-tailored prescription drugs may create a unique set 
of challenges for physicians. Physicians may be subject to malprac-
tice liability for side effects associated with generic use of race-based 
medicines. Physicians might be placed in the uncomfortable situ-
ation in which they need to discern a particular individual’s racial 
background by asking a series of probing questions. further, physi-
cians might be subject to malpractice liability for failing to refer a 
patient to a genetic counselor for race-based medicines. ultimately, 
physicians may be forced to confront privacy issues in attempts to 
provide a particular patient with the best treatment possible, given 
that individual’s racial and ethnic background.
Off-label prescription of pharmacogenomic drugs
even though generic use, in which physicians prescribe drugs to 
untested subgroups or for untested uses not approved by fDa, of ordi-
nary pharmaceuticals is a commonly accepted practice, physicians 
could be subject to malpractice liability for generic uses of race-
based medicines when adverse side effects occur.148 for conventional 
pharma ceuticals, the failure of the drug label to mention its safety for 
a given racial group does not mean that the drug is unsafe or ineffec-
tive for that group.149 however, for patient-tailored therapies, generic 
use could constitute experimental treatment.150 this could be a con-
cern for physicians when patients request a prescription for a specific 
racially targeted therapy, or when a physician wishes to ensure that 
only persons of appropriate genotypes are recommended for tailored 
therapies. for example, it would not appear to make sense to recom-
mend BiDil to caucasian patients when it is targeted to self-identified 
african-americans.
as a result, physicians could be placed in the awkward position of 
having to discern subtle differences in race and ethnicity. Physicians 
could face claims for violation of anti-discrimination mandates if they 
base prescription decisions for race-based medicines upon their sub-
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 783.
149 Id.
150 Id.
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jective perceptions of a patient’s racial or ethnic identity.151 interracial 
individuals also could be problematic for physicians’ prescription deci-
sions. Physicians may be forced to find objective means to make such 
decisions. Besides pharmacogenomic tests, another avenue of deter-
mining if a race-based treatment is appropriate for an individual would 
be to conduct probing and detailed questioning of the individual’s 
ethnic ancestry.152 a more scientific alternative solution for ascertain-
ing ethnic identity would be to order a haplotype test to ascertain a 
patient’s geographic ancestry.153
Failure to refer and conduct screenings
Physicians also may be subject to malpractice liability for failing to 
refer a candidate for race-based medicines to genetic counselors.154 
Because physicians would be expected to guide their patients in the use 
of innovative pharmacogenomic medicines, physicians could be held 
liable for inappropriately relying on race as the sole proxy for a genetic 
profile.155 this could result in inappropriately denying a treatment to 
persons of another racial group than that targeted by a racially tailored 
therapy, but who have the same “genetic variant.”156 relying on race 
as a proxy also could cause physicians to provide the treatment inap-
propriately to persons of the targeted racial group, even though some 
members of that race would not have the assumed genetic profile.157 
this risk raises an associated need for physicians to provide pharmaco-
genomic screening tests to ascertain the suitability of patients for any 
race-based medicines.158
Privacy protections and issues for providers
the Director of the national institutes of health (nih), elias a. 
Zerhouni, M.D., stated that “comprehensive, genomics-based health 
care will become the norm, with individualized preventive medicine 
and early detection of illnesses.”159 Privacy and control of personalized 
medicine information will be one of the most significant issues facing 
151 “Racially-Tailored” Medicine, at 449.
152 Id.
153 See Jonathan Kahn, Race-ing Patients/Patenting Race: An Emerging Political Geography 
of Intellectual Property in Biotechnology, 92 iowa l. rev. 353, 382–83 (2007). Haplotyping 
is a tool for determining geographic ancestry based on an individual’s DNA matched 
against an international database, the International HapMap Project.
154 Id. 
155 Nuffield couNcil oN BioetHicS, PHarmacoGeNeticS: etHical iSSueS 42 (2003), available at 
 www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/pharmacogenetics_report.pdf. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Clinical Benefits of Pharmacogenomics, at 792. 
159 Press Release, NIH, NIH Seeks Input on Proposed Repository for Genetic Information 
(Aug. 30, 2006), available at www.nih.gov/news/pr/aug2006/od-30.htm.
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providers in the years to come. as discussed above, while state and 
federal lawmakers have begun to address these issues, current laws are 
inconsistent in their protection of genetic information. 
the privacy and security regulations promulgated under the hiPaa 
Privacy rule provide a federal floor of protection for “protected 
health information” (Phi).160 this would include genetic testing and 
personalized medicine data if that information were created or received 
by a healthcare provider, health plan, or healthcare clearing house.161 
however, Phi does not include information created or received by 
other entities, such as employers or insurance companies. under Gina, 
however, employers are required to apply the same privacy protections 
for “genetic information” as are applicable to medical information 
protected under hiPaa and the aDa.162 in addition, Gina mandates 
that genetic information falls within hiPaa’s definition of “protected 
health information” and must be treated as such when in the plan’s or 
insurer’s possession.163
in general, the hiPaa Privacy rule requires that an individual 
authorize the use and disclosure of his or her Phi.164 Despite this 
seemingly expansive protection—as described in the notice of Privacy 
Practices providers and insurers are required to provide to patients—
there are broad exceptions where individual authorization is not 
required, including uses and disclosures for treatment, payment, 
and healthcare operations.165 in addition, there is a long list of 
situations where authorization is not required because of public policy 
considerations (e.g., abuse or neglect, public emergencies, regulatory 
oversight, etc.).166 thus, broad exceptions for use and disclosure of 
Phi without individual authorization result in the protections offered 
to patients by the hiPaa Privacy rule being somewhat illusory.
Before the implementation of the hiPaa Privacy rule, many states 
had enacted laws to provide protection for the confidentiality of 
genetic testing information. in general, these laws give more protec-
tion to Phi than the hiPaa Privacy rule, which preempts only state 
160 42 U.S.C. § 1320; 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164. HIPAA contains two different sections relevant to 
a discussion of genetic information: one addressing non-discrimination in the health 
insurance context (42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg et. seq.) and the other addressing privacy of PHI 
(42 U.S.C. § 1320; 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164). The non-discrimination provisions are dis-
cussed above under Federal Legal Landscape, HIPAA.
161 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
162 GINA, tit. 2, § 206.
163 GINA, tit. 1, § 105(a). 
164 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1). HIPAA does not provide individuals who suffer damages as 
a result of any unlawful use or disclosure of PHI a private cause of action against the 
covered entity.
165 Id. § 164.506(a).
166 Id. § 164.512(a)–(l).
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laws that give less protection to Phi.167 thus, evaluating the interaction 
of the hiPaa Privacy rule with state laws is critical to understanding 
the privacy protection of genetic information.
in general, state laws make an individual’s authorization a pre requisite 
for disclosing genetic information, even where the hiPaa Privacy rule 
would not require authorization.168 while a fifty-state survey is beyond the 
scope of this article, it is noteworthy that twenty-seven states require an 
individual’s consent for the disclosure of genetic testing information.169 
in addition, some states require individual authorization for activities 
such as retaining genetic information and performing genetic tests.170 
although states frequently carve out exceptions for situations such 
as confirmation of paternity, identification of deceased persons, and 
criminal investigations and prosecutions, these exceptions are far more 
limited than under the hiPaa Privacy rule. as a result, states that offer 
protection of genetic information truly give the individual the ability 
to control access to that information. even so, that protection—and its 
scope—is inconsistent from state to state. as a result, the strength of 
a state’s laws protecting genetic information likely will determine how 
willing patients are to disclose that information, and providers who col-
lect or use genetic information will need to closely follow restrictions 
applicable in their jurisdictions.
Privacy and the duty to warn
every state recognizes a common law or statutory right to privacy.171 
Generally, geneticists are prohibited from disclosing a patient’s medi-
cal genetic information without the patient’s written authorization.172 
an exception exists for medical geneticists to disclose Phi to a patient’s 
friends and family members so that they may assist in the patient’s 
care.173 however, this exception does not allow a medical geneticist 
167 45 C.F.R. § 160.203.
168 The scope of “genetic information” is defined differently in various states. Oregon, for 
example, defines “genetic information” to include information about blood relatives 
while California’s statute refers to “genetic characteristics,” defined as a scientifically 
identifiable gene or chromosome that is known to be a cause of a disease or disorder. 
See or. rev. Stat. § 192.531(11); cal. iNS. code § 10147(b).
169 These states include Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia and Washington. See Nat’l Conference  
of State Legislatures, State Genetic Summary Table on Privacy Laws,  
www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/prt.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
170 Id.
171 Amy L. McGuire & Richard A. Gibbs, Currents in Contemporary Ethics: Meeting the Growing 
Demands of Genetic Research, 34 J.l. med. & etHicS 809, 809 (citing Standards for the 
Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462–829 (2000)).
172 Laura J. Cole & Lynn D. Fleisher, Update on HIPAA Privacy: Are You Ready?, 5 GeNeticS iN 
med. 183, 186 (2003).
173 Id.
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operating under the hiPaa Privacy rule to disclose Phi to benefit the 
patient’s family members.174
the hiPaa Privacy rule allows medical geneticists to disclose infor-
mation to prevent a “serious and imminent threat to the health or 
safety of a person or the public.”175 from an ethical standpoint, a physi-
cian’s duty to warn requires the “availability of medical interventions 
to reduce the risk of developing a disease or to lessen the ensuing 
harm.”176 for infectious diseases, for example, new York requires that 
a doctor warn a third party “when the service performed on behalf 
of the patient necessarily implicate[d] protection of ... other identi-
fied persons foreseeably at risk because of [the] relationship with the 
patient, whom the doctor knows or should know may suffer harm 
by relying on prudent performance of th[e] medical service.”177 
however, “[i]t is questionable whether the uncertain probability of a 
future genetic disease constitutes an imminent harm or a threat to 
the public interest.”178 the american society of clinical oncology sug-
gests that “federal requirements to justify a breach of confidentiality 
are [not] met by genetic syndromes of cancer predisposition.”179
there are varying successes in reducing a predisposition toward dis-
ease with the use of genetic information. for example, women with 
Brca mutations—gene mutations that may determine a woman’s like-
lihood of developing breast or ovarian cancer180—can reduce their risk 
of developing breast or ovarian cancer by 75 percent if they undergo 
surgical removal of the ovaries and fallopian tubes after childbearing.181 
some studies suggest that screening and prevention in hereditary 
breast, colon, and thyroid cancers is efficacious.182 other genetic dis-
eases, such as phenylketonuria, can be prevented through such means 
as dietary modification.183 however, there are minimal or no medical 
interventions for some genetic disorders, such as huntington disease 
and alzheimer’s disease.184 less than one percent of physicians believe 
174 Id.
175 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i).
176 Kenneth Offit et al., The “Duty to Warn” a Patient’s Family Members About Hereditary 
Disease Risks, 292 JAMA 1469, 1470 (2004) [hereinafter Duty to Warn].
177 Tenuto v. Lederle Lab., 687 N.E.2d 1300, 1303 (N.Y. 1997).
178 Duty to Warn, at 1471.
179 Am. Soc’y of Clinical Oncology, American Society of Clinical Oncology Policy Statement 
Update: Genetic Testing for Cancer Susceptibility, 21 J. cliNical oNcoloGy 2397, 2403 (2003) 
[hereinafter ASCO Policy Statement].
180 Mary-Claire King et al., Tamoxifen and Breast Cancer Incidence Among Women  
with Inherited Mutations in BRCA1 and BRCA2, 18 J. am. med. aSS’N. 2251 (2001). 
181 Duty to Warn, at 1470 (citing Noah D. Kauff et al., Risk-Reducing Salpingo-oophorectomy 
in Women with a BRCA1 or BRCA2 Mutation, 347 New eNG. J. med. 1609 (2002)). 
182 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
183 Id. (citing Wylie Burke et al., Genetic Test Evaluation: Information Needs of Clinicians, 
Policy Makers, and the Public, 156 am. J. ePidemioloGy 311 (2002)). 
184 Id.
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that it is ethical to breach patient confidentiality when no medical 
intervention exists.185
state courts hint that providers may be obligated in some instances 
to share genetic test results with a patient’s at-risk relatives.186 in Safer 
v. Estate of Pack, a daughter sued the estate of her father’s physician for 
failing to warn her about the risk of familial adenomatous polyposis,187 
a condition that leads to colon cancer by 40 years of age.188 her father’s 
physician diagnosed her father with the disease 30 years prior to her 
diagnosis of advanced colorectal cancer.189 had she been informed of 
the risk, she claimed, she would have had a prophylactic colectomy in 
her late teen years.190 although this new jersey court ultimately decided 
against the daughter based on evidence that she had colorectal screen-
ing at age 10, the court stated that the doctor’s duty to warn relatives is 
not always fulfilled by informing the patient about the genetic nature 
of the disease.191 Physicians must take reasonable steps to ensure that at-
risk family members receive the warning.192 one commentator worries 
that this duty might overburden some physicians, because it is difficult 
to locate family members of patients who are unwilling to share the 
news of their increased risk themselves.193
in Pate v. Threlkel, a daughter filed suit in florida against her mother’s 
physician because he did not warn her of her elevated risk of heredi-
tary thyroid cancer.194 if physicians recognized this condition early, she 
argued, they could have intervened by removing her thyroid gland and 
treating her with hormones.195 the mother’s physician never informed 
the mother that she needed to tell her daughter about the elevated 
cancer risk.196 the supreme court of florida held that the physician 
had a duty to inform the mother of the daughter’s risk; it held that 
privity was irrelevant, because the standard of care was intended to 
benefit the children.197
185 Id. (citing R. Beth Dugan et al., Duty to Warn At-Risk Relatives for Genetic Disease: Genetic 
Counselors’ Clinical Experience, 119C am. J. med. GeNeticS 27 (2003); Marni J. Falk et al., 
Medical Geneticists’ Duty to Warn At-Risk Relatives for Genetic Disease, 120A am. J. med. 
GeNeticS 374 (2003)).
186 Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Genetic Privacy and the Law: An End to Genetics 
Exceptionalism, 40 JurimetricS J. 21, 35 (1999).
187 Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1181 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1996).
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Duty to Warn, at 1471.
194 Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d. 278 (Fla. 1995).
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
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Because of the potential implication of genetic information for par-
ents, siblings, and children, some commentators suggest that patients 
who undergo genetic testing should designate recipients of genetic 
information to enable physicians to contact family members about ele-
vated risk potentials safely and easily, even if the patient has died before 
development of a test.198 it is foreseeable that genetic tests will become 
much more accurate in determining an individual’s predisposition to 
certain diseases, providing a compelling reason for disclosure to at-risk 
family members. in addition, more preventive measures with proven 
efficacy will be developed, increasing the likelihood that a judge will 
find a duty to warn third parties of test results. a potential negative 
externality to disclosure to at-risk family members will be the loss of 
study participants, but it would be wise for providers to seek consent to 
family-member disclosures proactively.
in general, a physician’s duty to warn is discretionary.199 a Presi-
dential commission established several conditions for a physician to 
breach confidentiality ethically by disclosing information to a patient’s 
relatives. three of the conditions are: 
(1) the high likelihood of harm if the relative were not 
warned,
(2) the identifiability of the relative, and 
(3) the notion that the harm resulting from failure to 
disclose would outweigh the harm resulting from 
disclosure.200 
Professional societies have expressed the opinion that physicians 
should advise patients about the usefulness of conveying genetic test 
results to at-risk family members. the american Medical association’s 
council on ethical and judicial affairs considered a proposal that 
physicians should provide a “genetic Miranda warning” before 
conducting a genetic test.201 this proposal would have required 
physicians to inform patients of situations in which the physicians would 
feel compelled to breach confidentiality by informing at-risk family 
198 Annette R. Patterson et al., Custodianship of Genetic Information: Clinical Challenges  
and Professional Responsibility, 23 J. cliNical oNcoloGy 2100, 2102 (2005).
199 Duty to Warn, at 1471.
200 Id. (citing Am. Soc’y of Human Genetics Social Issues Subcomm. on Familial  
Disclosure, ASHG Statement: Professional Disclosure of Familial Genetic Information,  
62 am. J. HumaN GeNeticS 474 (1998); Nat’l iNfo. reS. oN etHicS & HumaN GeNeticS,  
ScreeNiNG aNd couNSeliNG for GeNetic coNditioNS: tHe etHical, Social, aNd leGal imPlicatioNS  
of GeNetic ScreeNiNG, couNSeliNG, aNd educatioN ProGramS 1 (1983), available at  
www.bioethics.gov/reports/past_commissions/geneticscreening.pdf;  
comm. oN aSSeSSiNG GeNetic riSKS, iNSt. of med., aSSeSSiNG GeNetic riSKS:  
imPlicatioNS for HealtH aNd Social Policy (1994)).
201 Duty to Warn, at 1471.
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members about elevated genetic predispositions.202 after deliberation, 
the council decided to suggest that physicians should inform patients 
about the “circumstances under which they would expect patients to 
notify biological relatives of the availability of information related to the 
risk of disease.”203 similarly, the american society of clinical oncology 
suggests that physicians should “remind patients of the importance of 
communicating test results to family members ….”204 it is the american 
society of clinical oncology’s position that informing their patients of 
the risk discharges the physicians’ duty to warn.205
research and Patient-Tailored medicine
as discussed above, until the clinical research emphasis shifts 
from participants’ racial and ethnic backgrounds toward individuals’ 
genetic make-up, researchers should make efforts to include minority 
populations in trials to ensure equal benefit among different races. in 
addition to including minority participants, researchers may promote 
equal representation of minority groups by including experts from 
minority groups in the research and review process and by including 
minorities in institutional review boards.206 for instance, researchers 
from minority groups could evaluate Dna databanks to ensure that 
minority populations are adequately represented in the research.207
“Biobanks,” which store and analyze human tissue samples, hold 
tremendous promise for researchers mining tissue samples for genetic 
information.208 as emerging technology reduces the cost of genetic 
testing, the number of genome-wide association studies will increase 
tremendously.209 although biobanks hold great promise, the american 
public has concerns about providing genetic samples to biobanks. one 
concern is the potential that hackers will steal genetic information.210 
the public also is concerned with genetic codes that contain unobserv-
able, secret information about themselves.211 even individuals who do 
not have concerns about their own genetic information may have con-
cerns about the implications for their parents, siblings, and children 
202 Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs of the Am. Med. Ass’n, CEJA Report 9-A-03, 
Disclosure of Familial Risk in Genetic Testing, 8 GeNetic teStiNG 356 (2004).
203 Id.
204 ASCO Policy Statement, at 2397.
205 Id.
206 Pharmacogenomics, at 52–53.
207 Charles Weijer & Paul B. Miller, Protecting Communities in Pharmacogenetic  
and Pharmacogenomic Research, 4 PHarmacoGeNomicS J. 9–16 (2004). 
208 Edward J. Janger, Genetic Information, Privacy and Insolvency, 33 J.l. med, & etHicS 79 (2005).
209 Amy L. McGuire & Richard A. Gibbs, Meeting the Growing Demands of Genetic Research, 
34 J. l. med. & etHicS 809, 810 (2006).
210 Mary L. Durham, How Research Will Adapt to HIPAA: A View from Within the Healthcare 
Delivery System, 28 am. J.l. & med. 491, 495 (2002).
211 Id.
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if their genetic makeups were exposed.212 thus, to assuage potential 
participants’ fears about participation, the informed consent process 
for biobank donation should explain clearly the privacy protections 
that will be implemented.
Many donors demand extra protection because genetic informa-
tion is unique in comparison to other health information:
1. [i]t remains largely stable throughout life; 
2. [G]enetic fingerprints are remarkably identifiable; 
3. [G]enetic conditions are inherited, and thus 
genetic information can reveal information about 
an individual’s current family members and future 
offspring; and 
4. [G]enetic information can transcend health status to 
reveal predispositions and personal characteristics.213 
Despite affirmative actions to ensure the privacy of highly sensitive 
genetic information,214 researchers worry that legislatures, in passing 
statutes that focus on genetic privacy rather than health data privacy in 
general, will stir unwarranted fear that may discourage individuals from 
seeking genetic testing.215 although genetic information is unique, 
concerns about privacy may be explained by the general decline in the 
public trust of health professionals. seventy percent of americans have 
concerns about disclosing their medical records to researchers;216 yet 
americans support both ensuring the privacy of their medical records 
and encouraging medical research.217
Federal policy for the protection of human subjects
which specific protections apply to genetic research depends in part 
upon whether a study constitutes “human subjects research.” the fed-
eral Policy for the Protection of human subjects (common rule) sets 
guidelines that researchers must follow when they conduct human sub-
jects research.218 the common rule defines “research” as any “systematic 
212 Id.
213 James G. Hodge, Jr., Ethical Issues Concerning Genetic Testing and Screening in Public 
Health, 125C am. J. med. GeNeticS 66, 69 (2004) (citing Nat’l coNf. of State leGiSlatureS, 
GeNeticS Policy aNd law: a rePort for PolicymaKerS (2001)) [hereinafter Ethical Issues Con-
cerning Genetic Testing].
214 Joanne Hustead & Janlori Goldman, Genetics and Privacy, 28 am. J.l. & med. 285 (2002).
215 Ethical Issues Concerning Genetic Testing, at 69.
216 John M. Eisenberg, Can You Keep a Secret?: Measuring the Performance of Those 
Entrusted with Personal Health Information, 16 J. GeN. iNterNal med. 132 (2001).
217 George J. Annas, Medical Privacy and Medical Research—Judging the New Federal  
Regulations, 346 New eNG. J. med. 216 (2002) [hereinafter Judging the New  
Federal Regulations].
218 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(a). Researchers must provide the Office of Protection from Research 
Risks with a satisfactory assurance that their research complies with the Common Rule.
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investigation, including research development, testing and evaluation, 
designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge.”219 
of particular interest in the biobank context, the common rule 
states that “[p]rivate information must be individually identifiable 
(i.e., the identity of the subject is or may readily be ascertained by the 
investigator or associated with the information) in order for obtaining 
the information to constitute research involving human subjects.”220 
specifically, the office for human research Protections (ohrP) of 
hhs takes the position that data are individually identifiable “when 
they can be linked to specific individuals by the investigator(s) either 
directly or indirectly through coding systems.”221 thus, it seems likely 
that genetic research, which depends on identifiable genetic informa-
tion, would constitute human research.
the ohrP provides a safe harbor, however, for information that 
cannot be linked. a guidance document states that if the following con-
ditions are met, a study does not constitute human subjects research, 
because the information is not individually identifiable: 
(1) the private information or specimens were not collected spe-
cifically for the currently proposed research project through 
an interaction or intervention with living individuals; and
(2) the investigator(s) cannot readily ascertain the identity of 
the individual(s) to whom the coded private information or 
specimens pertain because, for example:
(a) the investigators and the holder of the key enter into 
an agreement prohibiting the release of the key to the 
investigators under any circumstances, until the indi-
viduals are deceased (note that the hhs regulations 
do not require the irB to review and approve this 
agreement);
(b) there are irB-approved written policies and operat-
ing procedures for a repository or data management 
center that prohibit the release of the key to the inves-
tigators under any circumstances, until the individuals 
are deceased; or
219 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d).
220 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f ).
221 office for HumaN reSearcH ProtS., deP’t of HealtH & HumaN ServS., GuidaNce oN reSearcH 
iNvolviNG coded Private iNformatioN oN BioloGical SPecimeNS 3 (2004), available at  
www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/cdebiol.pdf.
Research and Patient-Tailored Medicine 39
Journal of Health & Life Sciences Law Vol. 2, No. 2
(c) there are other legal requirements prohibiting the 
release of the key to the investigators, until the indi-
viduals are deceased.222
whether coded or anonymized genetic information is “identi-
fiable Phi” remains unclear. hhs recognizes this issue but has not 
promulgated any clarifying regulations. some researchers claim that 
“de-identified” genotypic data are actually potentially identifiable.223 
for example, single nucleotide polymorphisms (snPs), Dna sequence 
variations between members of the same species, can be used to iden-
tify individuals.224 there are databases of snP data in the public realm. 
it is possible that one who has access to individual genetic data might 
be able to match that data with public snP data.225 once this is done, 
any previously de-identified information linked to that individual in 
the public records would become available, severing anonymity.226 
researchers currently are exploring algorithms called re-identification 
of Data in trails (reiDit) to link public genomic data to individual 
patients using patient location visit patterns.227
there are some methods that researchers who work with genetic 
information might use to prevent re-identification. one technique is to 
change randomly some snPs for each participant before releasing the 
genetic information.228 however, this is not an ideal situation, because 
researchers would like to use the true and correct genetic information, 
not data in which “noise” has been introduced. another method would 
be to “group snPs into bins.”229 By “[d]isregarding exact genomic loca-
tions of snPs[, one] increases the number of records that share the same 
values ....”230 some researchers remain skeptical about this approach 
because “the pattern of binned values is unlikely to match anyone other 
than the owner of the Dna.”231 in addition, binning would make genetic 
analysis difficult.232 others have suggested encrypting identifying infor-
mation associated with the genetic information, such as subjects’ names 
and social security numbers, into pseudonyms.233
222 Id. at 4.
223 Zhen Lin et al., Genomic Research and Human Subject Privacy, 305 Sci. 183,183 (2004) 
[hereinafter Genomic Research].
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Bradley Malin & Latanya Sweeney, How (Not) to Protect Genomic Data Privacy  
in a Distributed Network: Using Trail Re-Identification to Evaluate and Design  
Anonymity Protection Systems, 37 J. Biomedical iNformaticS 179 (2004)  
[hereinafter Using Trail Re-Identification].
228 Id. (citing Leon Willenborg & Ton de Waal, elemeNtS of StatiStical diScloSure coNtrol 
(2001)).
229 Genomic Research, at 183.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Using Trail Re-Identification, at 179. 
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where the common rule does apply, it contemplates the protec-
tion of privacy of participants in research studies. the relevant section 
of the common rule states:
in order to approve research covered by this policy, 
the irB shall determine that … [w]hen appropriate, 
there are adequate provisions to protect the privacy of 
subjects and to maintain the confidentiality of data.234 
in addition, the common rule mandates that subjects receive 
“[a] statement describing the extent, if any, to which confidentiality 
of records identifying the subject will be maintained[.]”235 further, if 
asked, researchers should be able to explain to the subjects how their 
information will be protected.236
to ensure potential research participants are informed adequately 
about the risks and benefits of taking part in genetic clinical studies, 
researchers must obtain participants’ informed consent.237 the basic 
components of this process include disclosing the study’s purpose, the 
benefits as well as the risks, and the roles of the participants in the 
study.238 See the earlier section, Informed consent of research subjects, on 
pages 24 and 25, for a discussion of related manufacturer liabilities.
as discussed above, clinical studies, especially human genetic research 
studies, based on homogenous samplings will be biased in their appli-
cability if race and ethnicity are not taken into consideration.239 Bias 
occurs in many clinical studies, partially because many racial or ethnic 
minorities do not wish or are not asked to participate as research sub-
jects. if racial or ethnic minorities do participate, researchers must be 
sensitive to issues that may arise if minority participants may not under-
stand the purpose or potential risks and benefits involved in research, 
whether due to cross-cultural issues, low literacy rates, lack of access to 
healthcare, lack of education, or other factors.240 
234 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a), (a)(7).
235 Id. § 46.116(a)(5).
236 Id.
237 Nat’l Human Genome Research Inst., Informed Consent, www.genome.gov/10002332 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2008). 
238 Christen Brownlee, Johns Hopkins Med. Insts., Study Into Informed Consent for Clinical 
Trials, med. NewS today, Jan. 14, 2008, www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/93839.php 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2008). 
239 Kjersti Aagaard-Tillery et al., Sample Bias Among Women with Retained DNA Samples 
for Future Genetic Studies, 1 oBStetricS & GyNecoloGy 1115, 1116 (2006). See also Patient-
Tailored Medicine, Part One, and the earlier discussion of the role of the Food and Drug 
Administration.
240 See Gordon Gong et al., Ethical, Legal and Social Issues of Genetic Studies with African 
Immigrants as Research Subjects, 100 J. Nat’l med. aSS’N 1073, 1076 (2008). 
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The HIPAA Privacy Rule and research
the hiPaa Privacy rule was not adopted either to encourage or 
discourage research.241 the Privacy rule strives “to strike a balance by 
minimizing the privacy risks of research participants, while not imped-
ing the conduct of vital national and international research.”242
the advancement of medical knowledge through research requires 
access to medical information.243 in accordance with the common 
rule, research protocols and consent forms must be reviewed by an 
institutional review board (irB).244 researchers must receive authori-
zation to obtain medical records for each individual genetic research 
project; however, because authorizations cannot be re-used, a new 
consent to use medical records must be obtained for each project.245 
the hiPaa Privacy rules provide that valid written authorizations to 
release Phi must include:
(i) a description of the information to be used or dis-
closed that identifies the information in a specific 
and meaningful fashion.
(ii) the name or other specific identification of the 
person(s), or class of persons, authorized to make 
the requested use or disclosure.
(iii) the name or other specific identification of the 
person(s), or class of persons, to whom the covered 
entity may make the requested use or disclosure.
(iv) a description of each purpose of the requested use 
or disclosure. the statement “at the request of the 
individual” is a sufficient description of the purpose 
when an individual initiates the authorization and 
does not, or elects not to, provide a statement of 
the purpose.
(v) an expiration date or an expiration event that 
relates to the individual or the purpose of the use 
or disclosure. the statement “end of the research 
study,” “none,” or similar language is sufficient if the 
authorization is for a use or disclosure of protected 
241 Judging the New Federal Regulations, at 216.
242 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 
14,775, 14,793 (Mar. 27, 2002) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
243 Jennifer Kulynych & David Korn, Use and Disclosure of Health Information in Genetic 
Research: Weighing the Impact of the New Federal Medical Privacy Rule, 28 am. J.l. & med. 
309, 310 (2002) (citing Amitai Etzioni, tHe limitS of Privacy 152 (1999)).
244 45 C.F.R. § 46; Judging the New Federal Regulations, at 216–17 (2002).
245 45 C.F.R. § 46; Lynn S. Muller & Dominick L. Flarey, Genetic Research Implications,  
9 liPPiNcottS caSe mGmt. 45 (2004).
Diversity Council: Patient-Tailored Medicine
Journal of Health & Life Sciences Law Vol. 2, No. 2
42
health information for research, including for the 
creation and maintenance of a research database 
or research repository.
(vi) signature of the individual and date. if the autho-
rization is signed by a personal representative of 
the individual, a description of such representa-
tive’s authority to act for the individual must also 
be provided.246
Sharing information between researchers
anecdotal evidence suggests that the hiPaa Privacy rule impedes 
sharing of information between researchers. for instance, in a johns 
hopkins genetics study on prostate cancer covering 14 institutions, 
the institutions refused to combine data into a centralized database 
of genetic data for family members. such a database could have been 
used to search for cancer susceptibility genes across hospitals, but in 
refusing to do so, the hospitals cited hiPaa Privacy rule concerns.247 
instead, each institution conducts its own analysis and shares a sum-
mary with the other researchers.248 in such situations, each institution 
makes its own decision whether to participate—hiPaa is the floor of 
protection.
in any case, researchers must inform their subjects about opportuni-
ties to share genetic information among researchers, and must explain 
the risks and benefits from their participation. 249 in addition, study 
participants must be given the opportunity to refuse participation in 
the research.250
Conclusion
although personalized medicine is an exciting new phenomenon 
that has the potential of revolutionizing medicine in the coming years, 
there are many obstacles.251 in the present regulatory, healthcare 
industry, and societal climate, clinical trials for drug safety and effec-
tiveness often fail to include minority participants. as a result, much 
remains unknown about the way in which an individual of a particular 
race, ethnic background, or genotype will react to certain medica-
tions. there is a longstanding need in america to remedy disparities 
246 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(1)(i)–(vi).
247 Jocelyn Kaiser, Privacy Rule Creates Bottleneck for U.S. Biomedical Researchers,  
305 Sci. 168, 169 (2004).
248 Id.
249 Amy L. McGuire & Richard A. Gibbs, Meeting the Growing Demands of Genetic Research, 
34 J. l. med. & etHicS 809 (2006). 
250 Id.
251 Promise of Personalized Medicine.
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in healthcare access for minorities. as a corollary, there is a compelling 
moral and ethical argument that race-based therapies must be pro-
tected by the courts from excessive legal burdens so that the united 
states can achieve greater equality in the healthcare system by foster-
ing the growth of both new and existing race-based therapies.
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